Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

Kay Gneiting; Kerry Rick Hubble; and Wilderness
Building Systems, Inc., a Utah Corporation v.
Dennis Blaine Vance : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffrey Weston Shields, Lawrence R. Dingivan; Purser, Edwards & Shields; attorney for appellant.
Kent L. Christiansen; Christiansen & Sonntag; attorney for appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Gneiting v. Vance, No. 950342 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6675

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Ul rr

' - > i COURT

K
45

.sy
DOCKLI

UrUEF

m.QscLbHXtfr

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK HUBBLE;
and WILDERNESS BUILDING SYSTEMS,
INC., a Utah Corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiffs
and Appellees

Case No. 950342-CA

vs.
DENNIS BLAINE VANCE,
Third-Party Defendant
and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court,
In and For Salt Lake County
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Argument Priority Classification 15
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (#2948)
LAWRENCE R. DINGIVAN (#5193)
Attorney for Third Party
De fendant/Appellant
PURSER EDWARDS & SHIELDS
215 South State Street
800 Parkside Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-3555
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN, ESQ.
Attorney for Third-Party
Plaintiffs/Appellees
CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG
420 East South Temple, No. 345
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-3762

FILED
NOV 1 7 1995
COURT OF APPEALS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Argument
POINT I:

POINT II:

1
THE HUBBLE PLAINTIFFS* CHARACTERIZATION
OF THEIR NOVEMBER 1, 1994 MOTION AS ONE
UNDER UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b)
IS UNAVAILING

1

THE FUNCTION OF THE COUNTERMOTION IS
FOREIGN TO RULE 60(b)

6

POINT III:

THE HUBBLE PLAINTIFFS WERE OBLIGED TO SEEK
RELIEF FROM THE OCTOBER 20 JUDGMENT
UNDER RULE 59(e)
10

POINT IV:

THE DISTRICT COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF THE
COUNTERMOTION IS NOT A MATTER VESTED IN
THE DISCRETION OF THAT COURT

12

Conclusion and Relief Sought

12

Certificate of Mailing

14

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE LAW
PAGE
Ackermann v. United States,
340 U.S. 193 (1950)

9

Ellas v. Ford Motor Co.r
734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir. 1984)

8

Kunzler v. Q'Dellr
855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1993)

4, 5, 7

McNight v. United Stated Steel Corp.,
726 F.2d 333, 338 (7th Cir. 1984)

8

Rees v. Albertons. Inc.,
587 P.2d 130, 131-32 (Utah 1978)

6

Reyher v. Champion International Corp..
975 F.2d 483, 488 (8th Cir. 1992)
U.S. V. DeutSCh,
981 F.2d 299, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1992)
U.S. v Accounts Nos. 3034504504 and 144-07143.
971 F.2d 974, 987 (3d. Cir. 1992)
Van Skiver v. U.S.,
952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991)

6, 12
3-5
5
4, 7, 9-11

STATUTES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7

3 et passim

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59

3 et passim

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60

2 et passim

TREATISES
7 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice.
2nd ed. V 60-22[3])

iii

6, 9, 10

EXHIBITS
1

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60

iv

Exhibit 'A"

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK HUBBLE;
and WILDERNESS BUILDING SYSTEMS,
INC., a Utah Corporation,

]

Third-Party Plaintiffs
and Appellees

]>

vs.

]

DENNIS BLAINE VANCE,

Case No. 950342-CA

]

Third-Party Defendant
and Appellant.

]

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appellant Dennis Vance ("Mr. Vance") submits the following
Brief in Reply to the Brief Of Appellees Kerry Rick Hubble and
Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. (collectively, the "Hubble
Plaintiffs") dated October 18, 1995.
THE HUBBLE PLAINTIFFS' CHARACTERIZATION OF
THEIR NOVEMBER 1. 1994 MOTION AS ONE UNDER
UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(bl IS UNAVAILING
In the Opposing Brief, the Hubble Plaintiffs are at pains to
deflect attention from the fact that they filed their "Memorandum
in Response to Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance's Motion to Set
Aside Judgment and Countermotion for Compensatory Damages,
November 1, 1994, (the "Countermotion"), R. 431-435; see also
1

Exhibit "CH to Appellant's Opening Brief, 12 days after entry of
the final judgment that the Countermotion was crafted to amend.
For example, in the Opposing Brief's introductory "Statement of
Relevant Facts, " the Hubble Defendants curiously omit all
reference to the chronology pertaining to their submission of the
Countermotion to the District Court, Sfifi Brief of Appellees,
October 18, 1995, at 2-4.
The Hubble Plaintiffs ignore the tardy filing of the
Countermotion for two reasons.

First, doing so perpetuates the

fallacy that the lapse of time between the entry of the October
20 Judgment and the filing of the Countermotion has no bearing on
the Countermotion' s legal capacity to amend the Judgment. Second,
affecting a seeming disinterest in accounting for this passage of
time strengthens the Hubble Plaintiffs' contention that they
always intended to have the Countermotion received and evaluated
by the District Court under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
It is worth noting that in their campaign to link the
Countermotion with Rule 60(b), the Hubble Plaintiffs steer well
clear of the text of the Countermotion itself. Indeed, the
Countermotion, the centerpiece of this dispute, is relegated to
Exhibit C to the Opposing Brief and is never cited by the Hubble
Plaintiffs.

From the Hubble Plaintiffs' perspective at least,

there is a sound reason for shunning the Countermotion.

Nothing

about that document, not its title, not its text, and not its
2

prayer for relief, even hints at an invocation of Rule 60(b).
Thus, aside from being most unhelpful in aiding the Hubble
Plaintiffs1 cause, the Countermotion runs foul of Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 7(b)(1) which obliges a party applying for an
Order from the trial court to state the grounds for its motion
"with particularity."
Though the Countermotion exhibits no ties to Rule 60(b), the
Hubble Plaintiffs maintain that the evidentiary standards of Rule
60(b) are applicable to it by default.

On this solitary

procedural point, the Hubble Plaintiffs are only partly correct.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
explained, a post-judgment motion served within 10 days following
the entry of a judgment is evaluated under the criteria of Rule
59(e). U.S. v. Deutschr 981 F.2d 299, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1992);
accord Van Skiver v. U.S., 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir.
1991 ). x

On the other hand, a motion submitted more than ten

days after entry of the Judgment is assessed under the standards
of Rule 60(b).2
1

Federal rules and cases may be used in the interpretation
of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b).
Kunzler v.
QlDfill, 855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1993).
2

The application of Rule 59(e) to motions served within ten
days of judgment is limited to "substantive" judgments, i.e.r those
that "if granted would result in a substantive alteration in the
judgment. . . " Deutschr 981 F.2d at 301 n.2; accord Dal ton v.

First Interstate Bank of Denver, 863 F.2d 702, 703-04 (loth cir.
1988).
3

The Hubble Plaintiffs maintain that a 'ten-day breakpoint"
rule, such as that announced in Deutschr settles the question of
whether the Countermotion was properly heard by the District
Court.

Because the Countermotion was filed twelve days after

October 20, the Hubble Plaintiffs insist, Rule 60(b)
automatically confers procedural legitimacy on their ambiguous
drafting and the only outstanding issue is abuse of judicial
discretion. Sfifi Brief of Appellees, October 18, 1995, at 8
(citing Kunzler v. Q'Dellr 855 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1993)).
This proposed rule of decision is simplistic and unknown in
federal or Utah jurisprudence.
As the Kunzler court correctly observed, the character of a
post-judgment motion is never determined by reference to the
motion1 s title.

But neither is it established solely by

reference to a calendar.

Whether a post-judgment motion is

governed by Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) is determined ultimately by
the function of the motion. U.S. v. Accounts Nos. 3034504504 and
144-07143r 971 F.2d 974, 987 (3d. Cir. 1992) (Emphasis added.);
Darrington v. Wade. 812 P.2d 452, 457 (Utah App. 1991)
(defendant's supplemental statement of objections was the
functional equivalent of a Rule 60(b) motion).

This compre-

hensive rule of construction, though ignored in the Opposing
Brief, is central to a proper assessment of the character of a
post-judgment motion.

As the U.S. Court of Appeals explained in
4

Peutsch, adoption of the rule urged by the Hubble Plaintiffs in
this appeal "effectively reads the ten-day time limit out of Rule
59(e) because untimely 59(e) motions will now be analyzed under
Rule 60(b) instead of being dismissed, Peutschr 981 F.2d 301.
But when the purpose of the motion at issue is taken into
account, the Seventh Circuit Court observed, the ten-day
breakpoint rule does not immunize untimely Rule 59(e) motions
from a summary dismissal.
[S]ubstantive motions served from the
eleventh day on must be shaped to the
specific grounds for modification or reversal
listed in Rule 60(b) — they cannot be
general pleas for relief. . . Consequently
Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) will retain their
distinct characters, and litigants should not
expect to employ our rule as a Trojan horse
for sneaking what are actually tardy Rule
59(e) motions into the courtroom under the
guise of Rule 60(b). Nor will our rule
burden District Judges with agonizing over
whether a motion asserts grounds for relief
included in Rule 60(b); it is the movant's
task to make its contentions clear.
PeutSCh, 981 F.2d at 301-02; compare U.R.C.P. 7(b)(1). Thus,
"when a motion can fairly be characterized as one under Rule
59(e) (i.e.r lacking any special circumstances justifying relief
under Rule 60(b)) it must be filed within the 10-day period and
will not be treated under Rule 60(b)(l).,f Reyher v. Champion
International Corp,r 975 F.2d 483, 488 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting 7

James w. Moore, Moore f s Federal Practice 2d ed. V 60-22[3]]).

5

THE FUNCTION OF THE COUNTERMOTION IS FOREIGN TO RULE 60(b).
The Opposing Brief gives preciously few clues about which of
the several legal grounds available under Rule 60(b) sustain the
District Court's consideration of the Countermotion.

The

Opposing Brief's "Summary of Argument" excerpts subsection (1)
(mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect) and (7)
(any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment).

The "Argument" section of the Opposing Brief sets out

an extended quotation from Rees v. Albertonsf Inc.r 587 P.2d 130,
131-32 (Utah 1978), for the proposition that a trial court may
correct any order entered by mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect.

The difficulty in analyzing the argument of

the Opposing Brief is that even considering these fleeting
references to Rules 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(7), it contains absolutely
no application of any subsection of Rule 60fb) to the facts of
this case. SfiB Brief of Appellees at 6-14.

As a result, as this

Court analyzes the Opposing Brief, it is put in the same
unfortunate position as the District Court on November 1, 1994,
upon receipt of the Countermotion.

In both circumstances, the

reviewing court is forced to agonize over the proper application
of procedural rules in response to the Hubble Plaintiffs' vague
call for relief from the October 20 Judgment.

But at least in

these proceedings, the reviewing court may bypass that fulsome
task by observing that the function of the Countermotion was to

6

amend the October 20 Judgment and its corresponding findings of
fact and conclusions of law and therefore has no relation to Rule
60(b),
The Hubble Plaintiffs argue, correctly, that Rule 60(b) is
to be liberally construed. Brief of Appellees at 9; &££ Kunzler
v. O ' D Q I I , 855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1993).

Nonetheless,

relief under Rule 60(b) is discretionary with the trial court and
may be granted only if the movant demonstrates exceptional
circumstances "by satisfying one or more of Rule 60(b)fs seven
grounds for relief from judgment. Van Skiver v. U.S., 952 F.2d
1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1991).

Assuming the Hubble Plaintiffs

intend to invoke Rule 60(b)(1), they must be prepared to show by
reference to the record in this case that the District Court's
award of no compensatory damages against Mr. Vance was a
consequence of mistake or inadvertence.

But the record simply

will not allow the Hubble Plaintiffs to demonstrate that point.
As the transcript of the August 18, 1994, proceedings before the
Honorable Homer Wilkinson make clear, the District Court's award
of only punitive damages against Mr. Vance was a deliberate
(though voidable) ruling.

At that point in the August 18

proceedings, the following exchange occurred between the
Honorable Homer Wilkinson and Mr. Vance:
THE COURT:

Mr. Vance, any questions sir,

MR. VANCE:

There's no compensatory damages.
7

There's punitive damages against me from the
Third Party Plaintiff; is that correct?
THE COURT:

Yes, punitive damages, only.

MR. VANCE:

Okay, I understand.

Transcript, Telephone Conference, August 18, 1994, at 7 (R. 362).
Where the Hubble Plaintiffs find either mistake or inadvertence
lodged in this dialogue is unfathomable.
Beyond showing that the District Court did not act out of
mistake or inadvertence within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1), this
transcript excerpt demonstrates that the error of which the
Hubble Plaintiffs complained in the Countermotion, is not one
that may be corrected under Rule 60(b)(1).

After all, M"mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect' does not include
errors of law.M Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st
Cir. 1984); McNight v. United Stated Steel Corp.. 726 F.2d 333,
338 (7th Cir. 1984) (Rule 60(b) is not intended to correct errors
of law made by the District Court in the underlying decision
which resulted in a final judgment).
The Hubble Plaintiffs' alternate recourse to Rule 60(b)(7)
yields the same result.

While generally Rule 60(b) is construed

liberally, that is not the case with respect to subsection
60(b)(7).

One resorting to subsection (7) first must demonstrate

that its claim for relief from the judgment is not more
appropriately addressed to the six alternative legal grounds

8

available under subsections (l)-(6). 7 James W. Moore, Moorefs
Federal Practice f 60.27[1] at 60-266 (2d ed. 1992) (citing
cases).

But here, neither the Countermotion nor the Opposing

Brief takes the trouble to make any such showing.

As noted

above, the Brief of Appellees mounts absolutely no argument tying
any subsection of Rule 60(b) to the facts of this case.

In

addition, the Opposing Brief makes no effort to point up the
unavailability of relief under subsections 60(b)(1) through
60(b)(6).

Indeed,

as explained above, the Opposing Brief

appears to embrace Rule 60(b)(1).

In any event, the Hubble

Plaintiffs may not couch their request for relief under Rule
60(b)(7), the "grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice
in a particular case." Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1244. Rule
60(b)(7) may be invoked only in exceptional and compelling
circumstances, and may not be used as a substitute for appeal.
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950); MoorefS Federal
Practice if 60.27[1] at 269.

Thus where a party attempts to

secure relief under that subsection it must state clearly why
relief is unavailable under the alternate grounds available under
Rule 60(b) and, in addition, why a correction of legal error by
appeal was not available. Moore's Federal Practice at 60-270 to
271.

9

THE HUBBLE PLAINTIFFS WERE OBLIGED TO SEEK RELIEF
FROM THE OCTOBER 20 JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 59(e)
The "best evidence" of which procedural rule must govern
consideration of the Countermotion is found in the text of the
Countermotion.

That document, four pages in length, is a summary

recital of proceedings before the District Court on June 1, 1994.
The Countermotion reviews and vouches for the evidence the Hubble
Plaintiffs mounted against Mr. Vance on June 1 and thereafter
asks the Court to enter a different judgment based upon that
evidence.

Because the function of the Countermotion was to

revisit the Hubble Plaintiffs' claims for relief and supporting
evidence, and, in addition, to suggest that the ruling on those
claims in evidence was legal error, the Countermotion must be
brought under Rule 59(e).

In Van Skiver v. U.S.r 952 F.2d 1241

(10th Cir. 1991), the plaintiff/appellants appealed from the
District Court's Order denying their "Motion to Reconsider" the
Court's judgment against them.

The Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals noted that the plaintiffs failed to classify their motion
as one under either Rule 59(e) or under 60(b) and further
observed that the plaintiff's motion was not served within ten
days of the District Court's Judgment. Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at
1243.
In affirming the District Court's denial of the plaintiff's
motion the Tenth Circuit Court declared that the plaintiffs had
10

failed to demonstrate any bases for Rule 60(b) relief. Id.

That

court explained the legal bases for its ruling:
Plaintiffs' motion did not recite any of the
exceptional circumstances warranting relief
under Rule 60(b), nor does our reading of the
record disclose any. In essence, plaintiffs'
motion reiterated the original issues raised
in their complaint and sought to challenge
the legal correctness of the District Court's
Judgment by arguing that the District Court
misapplied the law or misunderstood their
position. Such arguments are properly
brought under Rule 59(e) within ten days of
the District Court's judgment or on direct
appeal but do not justify relief from the
District Court's Judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b).
Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1244.
The Hubble Plaintiffs, both through their Countermotion and
again in their Opposing Brief, are on the same tack as the
plaintiffs in Van Skiver.

They submitted an ambiguous Motion for

Reconsideration and sought to reargue their case to the District
Court through the vehicle of the Motion.

Just as the Appellate

Court in Van Skiver determined that Rule 59(e) governed such a
motion, this Court must declare the same result as well.

Given

the relief sought by the Hubble Plaintiffs, their only recourse
for post-judgment reconsideration was through Rule 59(e).

They

failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of that rule
that such a motion be filed within ten days of entry of final
judgment.

They failed to meet that deadline and as a result,

"the District Court [lost] jurisdiction over that motion and any
11

ruling on it becomes a nullity." Reyher v» Champion International
CQULW

975 F.2d 483, 489 (8th Cir. 1992).
THE DISTRICT COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF THE
COUNTERMOTION IS NOT A MATTER VESTED IN
THE DISCRETION OF THAT COURT

The Hubble Plaintiffs argue that a District Court's
consideration of a Rule 60(b) motion is discretionary and that
Court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion. £g& Brief of Appellees at 9.
simply begs the question.

This legal analysis

The principal issue before this Court

is which procedural guideline, either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b),
governs the District Court's consideration of the Countermotion.
The fact that the District Court elected to rule on the
Countermotion is squarely before this Court; how the District
Court ruled on the Countermotion is not.

Accordingly, this Court

may dismiss this aspect of the Hubble Plaintiffs' argument out of
hand.
CONCLUSION
In the proceeding Brief, Mr. Vance has shown that there is
no legal basis available to the Hubble Plaintiffs for maintaining
the Countermotion under Rule 60(b).

Given the type of relief

that the Hubble Plaintiffs were seeking through the
Countermotion, they were obligated to observe the strictures of
Rule 59(e).

Given the function of the Countermotion, Rule 60(b)

simply has no application in this case.
12

When the District Court considered the late-filed
Countermotion, it acted beyond its jurisdiction.

Its ruling on

that motion is therefore a nullity and of no legal effect on Mr.
Vance.

Though typically an Appellate Court does not visit the

merits of the judgment underlying a post-judgment motion, in this
case it must.

As Mr. Vance pointed out in his Opening Brief, the

District Court's October 20 Judgment is one for punitive damages
only.

Such a result is contrary to established Utah law.

The

analysis on this point is simply this: the District Court
determined that Mr. Vance inflicted no injury on the Hubble
Plaintiffs for which compensatory damages were warranted.

In

other words, the Hubble Plaintiffs failed to make out their cause
of action against Mr. Vance.

If there is no culpable conduct,

let alone conduct that evidences a conscious disregard for the
rights of the Hubble Plaintiffs, there may be no award of
punitive damages.

This Court must either vacate the award of

punitive damages against Mr. Vance or in the alternative direct
the District Court to conduct new trial proceedings and enter a
lawful ruling against iVit. Vance.
DATED this If'

clay of November, 1995.
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Tab A

Rule 60

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

178

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence coujd not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALY8I8

"Any other reason justifying relief."
—Default judgment.
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel.
—Lack of due process.
—Merits of case.
—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Mutual mistake.
—Real party in interest.
—Refund of fine after dismissal.
Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
—Estate record.
—Inherent power of courts.
—Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Court's discretion.
Default judgment.
Effect of set-aside judgment.
—Admissions.

Form of motion.
Fraud.
—Burden of proof.
—Divorce action.
Independent action.
—Constitutionality of taxes.
—Divorce decree.
—Fraud or duress.
—Motion distinguished.
Invalid summons.
—Amendment without notice.
Inequity of prospective application.
Jurisdiction.
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect
—Default judgment.
Illness.
Inconvenience.
Meritorious.
Merits of claim.
Negligence of attorney.
No claim for relief.
—Delayed motion for new trial.
—Factual error.
—Failure to file cost bill.
—Failure to file notice of appeal.
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings.

